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Abstract	Within	coronial	 investigations,	pathologists	are	called	upon	to	given	evidence	as	 to	cause	of	death.	This	evidence	is	given	great	weight	by	the	coroners;	after	all,	scientific	‘truth’	is	widely	deemed	to	be	far	more	reliable	than	legal	 ‘opinion’.	The	purpose	of	this	paper	 is	to	examine	the	ontological	and	epistemological	status	of	that	evidence,	from	the	perspectives	of	both	the	pathologists	 and	 the	 coroners.	 As	 part	 of	 an	 Australian	 Research	 Council	 Linkage	 Grant,	interviews	 were	 conducted	 with	 seven	 pathologists	 and	 10	 coroners	 from	 within	 the	Queensland	 coronial	 system.	 Contrary	 to	 expectations,	 and	 the	 work	 of	 philosophers	 of	science,	 such	 as	 Feyerabend	 (1975),	 pathologists	 did	 not	 present	 their	 findings	 in	 terms	 of	unequivocal	 facts	or	objective	 truths	 relating	 to	 causes	of	death.	Rather,	 their	evidence	was	largely	presented	as	 ‘educated	opinion’	based	upon	 ‘the	weight	of	 evidence’.	 It	was	actually	the	 coroners	who	 translated	 that	opinion	 into	 ‘medical	 fact’	within	 the	proceedings	of	 their	death	 investigations,	 arguably	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 administrative	 necessity	 to	 reach	 a	clear-cut	 finding	 as	 to	 cause	 of	 death,	 and	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 their	 own	 understanding	 of	 the	ontology	 of	 medical	 knowledge.	 These	 findings	 support	 Latour’s	 (2010)	 claim	 that	 law	requires	a	fundamentally	different	epistemology	to	science,	and	that	science	is	not	entirely	to	blame	for	the	extravagant	truth-claims	made	on	its	behalf.	
	
	
Introduction	The	central	role	of	the	coroner	is	to	preside	over	the	investigation	of	unexpected	and	unnatural	deaths.	In	Australia,	where	coroners	are	legally	trained,	they	are	aided	in	their	investigatory	work	by	a	number	of	other	 agencies:	 police,	 who	 visit	 the	 scene	 of	 the	 death	 and	 gather	 relevant	 information;	 coronial	counsellors,	 who	 liaise	 with	 the	 family	 throughout	 the	 investigation;	 and	 pathologists,	 who	 perform	autopsies	 and	 other	medical	 procedures	 on	 the	 deceased.	 It	 is	 the	 coroners	who	 are	 responsible	 for	 a	determining	 the	 cause	 of	 death,	 the	 identity	 of	 the	 deceased	 and	 the	 date	 and	 place	 of	 death,	 and	 for	recording	this	information	in	the	Registry	of	Births,	Deaths	and	Marriages	(Barnes	and	Carpenter	2011).	Around	Australia,	deaths	investigated	by	coroners	make	up	only	a	small	percentage	—	between	10	and	20	 per	 cent	—	 of	 all	 deaths	 in	 a	 community	 (Freckelton	 and	 Ranson	 2006).	 For	 deaths	 that	 are	 not	reported,	the	cause	is	certified	by	individual	doctors	without	reference	to	the	coroner	at	all.	The	primary	focus	 of	 coronial	 investigations	 is	 neither	 criminal	 charges	 nor	 disciplinary	 action,	 but	 the	 benign	administrative	task	of	creating	accurate	death	certificates.	Over	95	per	cent	of	coronial	deaths	are	dealt	with	administratively	 ‘on	the	papers’,	with	only	the	small	remainder	deemed	sufficiently	contentious	to	warrant	an	inquest.		While	the	epistemological	and	administrative	 logic	of	such	death	 investigations	appears	to	be	relatively	straightforward	 and	 unproblematic,	 in	 actuality	 coronial	 courts	 have	 long	 been	 a	 site	 of	 contestation.	From	 its	 inception	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 twelfth	 century	 in	 England,	 the	 role	 of	 coroner	 has	 changed	 on	 a	number	 of	 occasions.	 Beginning	 principally	 as	 a	 revenue-raising	 office	 for	 the	 sovereign,	 the	 coroner	eventually	morphed	into	an	investigator	of	death.	Even	with	this	crucial	role,	the	position	of	the	coroner	eventually	 began	 to	decline	 in	 importance	due	 to	 the	 rise	 of	 a	 parallel	 legal	 office	—	 the	 Justice	 of	 the	Peace	—	 such	 that	 by	 1500	 the	 sole	 remaining	 function	 performed	 by	 the	 coroner	was	 the	 holding	 of	inquests	into	violent	deaths	(Knapman	1993).	Tension	continued	to	exist	between	these	two	positions	for	
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the	next	300	years,	and	it	was	only	completely	resolved	with	the	clarification	of	roles	 in	the	nineteenth	century.			This	has	not	been	the	only	point	of	contestation.	By	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	investigative	work	conducted	by	the	coroner	to	provide	evidence	 for	 inquests	was	delegated	to	the	police	 force	who	undertook	 these	 tasks	 under	 the	 direction	 of	 the	 coroner.	 As	 part	 of	 these	 changes,	 the	 long-standing	tradition	of	the	‘coronial	jury’	was	no	longer	mandatory.	Not	only	did	this	discontinue	the	practice	of	the	coroner	summonsing	juries	for	inquests,	but	it	also	established	a	lesser	reliance	on	the	lay	perspectives	of	the	public	that	constituted	these	juries	(Freckelton	and	Ranson	2006).	Burney	(2006)	contends	that	these	changes	signalled	the	start	of	a	long	struggle	over	the	role	of	coroner.	That	is,	medicine	began	a	struggle	for	dominance	against	much	older	forms	of	organisation	and	sets	of	truth-claims	—	largely	those	of	the	wider	 citizenry,	manifest	 in	 the	 forms	 of	 the	 elected	 jury,	 and	 the	 legal	 review	 of	 evidence	within	 the	public	hearing.			It	has	been	argued	elsewhere	that	this	 is	an	example	of	 the	contemporary	dominance	of	medical	 truths	over	other	sets	of	knowledges	(Carpenter	and	Tait	2010).	That	is,	legally	trained	coroners	now	prioritise	medical	cause	over	legal	circumstance	in	coronial	 investigations,	most	notably	through	a	heavy	reliance	on	orders	for	full	internal	autopsy.	Medical	truths	as	to	the	cause	of	death	are	used	as	confirmation	of	any	circumstantial	evidence	gathered	at	the	scene	and,	as	such,	the	objective	scientific	facts	presented	in	the	pathologist’s	report	become	the	final	arbiter	of	the	case.			This	paper	asks	the	question:	are	the	epistemological	issues	that	simple?	Do	doctors	bring	medical	facts	to	 the	 coronial	 investigation,	 facts	 that	 trump	 any	 other	 knowledges	 available	 to	 the	 coroner?	 Is	 the	coroner	 given	 no	 real	 choice,	 other	 than	 to	 accede	 to	 power	 of	 medical	 truth?	 Arguably,	 this	 study	presents	a	significantly	more	complex	picture.	
	
Medicine	and	the	production	of	truth	Truth	has	always	been	a	complex	philosophical	issue.	While	few	philosophers	would	consider	the	matter	in	any	way	resolved,	most	would	accept	that	the	rise	of	modernity	at	the	end	of	the	seventeenth	century	signalled	 a	 new	 way	 of	 approaching	 the	 issue.	 With	 its	 mantra	 of	 truth,	 progress	 and	 objectivity,	modernity	sought	to	step	out	of	what	 it	saw	as	the	 intellectual	dark	ages,	characterised	by	truth	claims	based	 upon	 religious	 authority	 and	 tradition,	 and	 replace	 them	 instead	with	 a	 new	 set	 of	 possibilities	surrounding	the	production	of	knowledge.	And	central	to	this	new	way	of	thinking	was	the	discipline	of	science.			For	 the	 last	 250	 years,	 the	 central	 operating	 logic	 of	 science	 is	 that	 truth	 is	 not	 something	 that	 we	produce,	 but	 rather	 something	 that	 we	 objectively	 and	 dispassionately	 uncover.	 Indeed,	 part	 of	 the	foundational	rationality	of	science	—	and,	in	particular,	the	scientific	method	—	is	that	science	is	the	only	way	of	reliably	accessing	truth.	This	depiction	should	be	familiar	to	all	of	us,	at	 first	glance,	science	has	always	been	 its	own	best	publicist,	 cordoning	off	 the	rights	 to	 the	production	of	 truth,	and	disparaging	other	 types	 of	 truth	 claims	 (Tait	 2005).	 This	 has	 particularly	 been	 the	 claim	 within	 modern	Western	medicine,	which	has	constantly	sought	to	marginalise	other	systems	of	healing	(Foucault	1973).			A	number	of	philosophers	have	taken	significant	issue	with	what	they	saw	as	science’s	depiction	of	itself	—	most	notably	Feyerabend	(1978).	He	suggests	that	a	number	of	qualifications	should	be	placed	upon	the	claims	made	by	science,	two	of	which	are	worthy	of	mention	here.	First,	Feyerabend	argues	that	the	relatively	uncritical	acceptance	of	scientific	truths	is	based	upon	a	belief	in	its	infallibility,	in	that	it	can	be	separated	from	all	other	 ideologies	—	religion,	myth,	superstition,	tradition	—	by	the	notion	that	 it	can	prove	its	claims.	Science	is	not	seen	as	requiring	any	form	of	faith	for	its	operation,	it	is	simply	regarded	as	 the	most	 efficient	means	 available	 for	 ‘uncovering’	 truth,	 based	 in	 the	 ‘fair,	 rigorous	 and	 controlled’	scientific	method.	 However,	 Feyerabend	 (1981)	 famously	 argues	 that	 there	 is	 no	 realistic	 evidence	 to	
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demonstrate	 that	 the	 scientific	method	 has	 any	more	 validity	 than	 do	 the	 standards	 that	 underlie	 the	practice	of	magic	—	given	that	the	‘rigorous’	scientific	method	is,	in	practical	terms,	a	generally	nebulous	collection	 of	 rules	 and	 procedures,	 applied	 unevenly	 and	 pragmatically,	 and	 ‘supplemented	 by	unscientific	methods	and	unscientific	results’	(Feyerabend	1978:	105).			Second,	 Feyerabend	 (1978,	 1981)	 argues	 that	 science	 is	 merely	 an	 ideology	 —	 more	 pervasive	 and	successful	 that	other	existing	 ideologies,	but	an	 ideology	nevertheless.	Analogous	 to	 the	right	 that	once	belonged	 to	 religion,	 science	 now	 exists	 in	 a	 conceptual	 framework	 that	 bestows	 upon	 it	 the	 sole	legitimate	right	to	contemporary	truth-formation.	Furthermore,	the	ideology	of	science	is	compulsory	(all	children	must	 be	 taught	 science),	 exclusory	 (other	 truth-building	 systems	 are	 debarred/ridiculed)	 and	undemocratic	(when	a	scientist	says	it	is	true,	it	must	be	true).			When	 this	 understanding	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 is	 applied	 to	 the	 information	 provided	 by	 the	pathologists	to	the	coroners	as	part	of	death	investigations,	Feyeraband	would	likely	make	the	following	observations:	first,	there	is	nothing	ontologically	absolute	about	the	truths	produced	via	the	autopsy.	The	medical	 methodologies	 that	 organise	 their	 assembly	 are	 shaped	 and	 executed	 within	 social	 contexts;	there	are	no	guarantees	as	to	the	consistency	of	their	application;	and,	during	the	autopsy	itself,	they	are	likely	to	be	supplemented	by	any	number	of	other	‘unscientific’	knowledges	and	practices.			Third,	Feyerabend	would	also	 likely	argue	 that	 the	pathologist’s	 report	often	operates	within	a	context	that	 is	 compulsory,	 exclusory,	 and	 undemocratic:	 it	 is	 compulsory,	 in	 that	 coroners	 often	 feel	epistemologically	 obliged	 to	 order	 autopsies,	 even	where	 the	 cause	 of	 death	 does	 not	 appear	 to	 be	 in	dispute;	 it	 is	exclusory,	 in	 that	medical	knowledges	are	deemed	to	supersede	other	 truth	claims	during	coronial	 inquiries,	 such	 as	 police	 evidence	 collected	 at	 the	 scene,	 when	 there	 is	 any	 disagreement	between	the	two;	and	it	 is	undemocratic,	 in	that	 if	a	pathologist	posits	a	particular	cause	of	death,	 then	that	is	precisely	how	they	died,	all	evidence	to	the	contrary	notwithstanding.			This	paper	will	 test	Feyerabend’s	assessment	of	scientific	knowledge,	via	the	specific	medium	of	expert	testimony	 within	 coronial	 inquiries.	 That	 is,	 the	 paper	 will	 explore	 aspects	 of	 the	 relation	 between	medical	 assessments	 of	 cause	 of	 death	 within	 the	 coronial	 system,	 and	 the	 findings	 reached	 by	 that	system.	Do	pathologists	present	‘facts’	to	coroners,	or	is	something	else	going	on?			
The	research	project	and	methodology	This	paper	 is	situated	within	a	ten-year	history	of	 funded	research	from	both	government	departments	and	 the	 Australian	 Research	 Council.	 In	 2005,	 the	 research	 began	with	 an	 exploration	 of	 the	 decision	making	of	coroners	in	the	context	of	the	newly	enacted	Coroners	Act	2003	in	Queensland.	All	closed	paper	coronial	files	for	the	first	12	months	of	the	operation	of	the	Coroners	Act	2003	were	examined	by	a	team	of	non-medical	researchers.	A	range	of	documents	were	used	to	create	a	picture	of	the	decision	making	process:	 initial	police	reports,	autopsy	orders	 from	the	coroner	to	the	pathologist,	autopsy	findings	and	follow-up	reports,	and	cause	of	death	certificates	issued	by	the	coroner	to	the	Registrar	of	Births,	Deaths	and	Marriages.	 Information	on	file	also	deemed	relevant	 included	any	written	correspondence	between	coroners,	pathologists,	police,	and	coronial	counsellors.			An	 issue	was	 identified	 in	 the	 research	which	 speaks	 directly	 to	 the	 current	 paper	 and	 also	 served	 to	inform	 subsequent	 research:	 the	 decision	 making	 of	 coroners	 often	 appeared	 to	 be	 inconsistent	 and	contradictory.	Subsequent	research	sought	to	explore	this	issue	(among	a	range	of	others)	in	more	depth	through	 interviews	 with	 a	 range	 of	 coronial	 personnel,	 including	 coroners,	 pathologists,	 counsellors,	nurses,	and	police.	 In	this	 instance,	questions	focused	upon	how	each	professional	group	organise	their	professional	responsibilities,	and	reach	their	conclusions.	Based	on	the	purposive	sampling	of	 the	most	experienced	 personnel	 in	 one	 Australian	 jurisdiction,	 10	 full	 time	 coroners	 and	 seven	 forensic	pathologists	were	 interviewed.	The	 interviews	were	 semi-structured,	 and	were	 conducted	over	a	nine-
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month	 period	 in	 2012,	 taking	 between	 one	 and	 two	 hours	 each	 to	 complete.	 All	 interviews	 were	conducted	 by	 one	 researcher	 for	 consistency	 of	 approach,	 and	 transcribed	 by	 a	 professional	 service	before	 being	 sent	 back	 to	 each	 interviewee	 for	 confirmation.	 Thematic	 analysis	 was	 the	 key	 process	utilised	 in	 this	 research,	 and	an	 inductive	approach	 to	 the	data	was	 favoured.	Thematic	 analysis	of	 the	transcripts	began	with	a	process	of	schematic	coding,	which	required	all	 transcripts	 to	be	read	 in	 their	entirety	 by	 the	 research	 team.	 Themes	 were	 identified	 through	 a	 series	 of	 discussions	 between	 the	research	team	where	both	dominant	and	emergent	themes	were	identified	and	then	reviewed.			At	 this	 point	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 thematic	 analysis	 is	 a	 recursive	 rather	 than	 a	 linear	 process	(Braun	and	Clarke	2006).	Rather	than	simply	moving	from	one	stage	to	the	next,	analysis	moves	back	and	forth	between	the	phases	as	required.	Once	‘expert	testimony’	was	identified	as	a	pertinent	issue	within	the	 transcripts,	 a	 process	 of	 schematic	 coding	began	where	 sub-themes	were	 then	 identified.	 The	 sub-themes	 were	 identified	 as:	 the	 coronial	 status	 of	 pathologists,	 the	 ontological	 status	 of	 medical	statements,	and	the	evidentiary	requirements	of	the	coronial	system.			
Results	
The	ontological	status	of	medical	statements	The	key	 finding	of	 this	 study	 is	 that	 the	 evidence	given	by	pathologists	 is	understood	 in	 very	different	ways	by	the	two	central	players	—	the	pathologists	themselves,	and	the	coroners.	This	research	suggests	that	 the	 evidence	 given	 by	 pathologists	 at	 coronial	 inquiries	 is	 always	 presented	 as	 ‘medical	 opinion’.	That	 is,	 causes	of	death	are	described	 in	 terms	of	 likelihood	and	probability,	 rather	 than	as	 categorical	and	indisputable	truths.			
Sometimes	 the	 duty	 pathologist	 and	 me	 may	 have	 a	 different	 opinion,	 so	 the	 duty	
pathologist	may	have	said,	yeah,	that’s	fine,	I’m	happy	with	an	external	and	may	then	come	
to	me	and	I	might	have	a	different	opinion.	Pathologist	5	
	
When	everything’s	 in,	we’ll	 collate	 it	all	 together	and	provide	a	report	 to	 the	coroner	and	
provide	him	with	our	 findings	and	present	him	with	our	opinion	as	 to	 the	cause	of	death.	Pathologist	4		
So	 you	 present	 your	 expert	 opinion	 and	 then	 the	 coroner	 makes	 a	 decision	 on	 that.	Pathologist	3		This	is	not	to	say	that	pathologists	do	not	often	have	very	high	degrees	of	confidence	in	their	opinions,	or	that	 those	opinions	are	not	 founded	upon	a	wealth	of	medical	data;	however,	 this	still	does	not	elevate	their	own	opinions	to	the	status	of	‘objective	truth’:			
When	I	walk	into	a	court	room	or	an	inquest	I	will	be	asked	to	maintain	the	highest	rigorous	
scientific	standards	as	to	what	I	found	and	I	will	be	expected	to	come	up	with	an	argument	
to	establish	why	 I	believe	 this	 is	 the	cause	of	death,	and	to	support	my	opinion	with	 facts.	
Now,	at	the	end	of	the	day	what	I	come	up	with	is	an	opinion,	but	I	have	to	demonstrate	that	
I’ve	got	a	sub-strata	of	facts	that	can	support	quite	solidly	that	opinion.	Pathologist	4		However,	 this	 is	not	generally	how	that	evidence	 is	received	by	 the	coroners.	Within	 the	context	of	 the	coronial	court,	this	research	suggests	that	‘medical	opinion’	is	translated	by	the	coroners	as	‘medical	fact’.			
Pathologists	are	able	to	say	what	the	cause	of	death	is;	we	usually	sign	it	off.	Coroner	2		
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According	 to	 this	 understanding	 of	 medical	 statements,	 autopsies	 do	 not	 simply	 provide	 additional	evidence	 for	 the	 coronial	 inquiry,	 they	 provide	 an	 unequivocal	 cause	 of	 death	 —	 an	 objective	 truth,	around	which	to	frame	a	matrix	of	explanation.		
So	 they’ll	 decide	 (the	 police)	 there’s	 no	 suspicious	 circumstances,	 that	 it	 was	 probably	 a	
natural	death;	but	then	the	autopsy	will	confirm	that.	Coroner	3		
	
Well,	you’ve	got	to	rely	on	the	medicine	of	it.	Coroner	9		Indeed,	the	medical	‘facts’	of	the	autopsy	are	often	understood	as	the	only	truly	indispensable	element	of	the	 investigation.	Other	 truth-claims	—	whether	made	by	witnesses,	 or	 from	police	 at	 the	 scene	of	 the	death	—	are	deemed	to	require	the	‘real’	truth	of	the	medical	autopsy	to	provide	a	solid	foundation	to	the	entire	process.			
So,	any	violent	or	unnatural	deaths,	or	deaths	arising	out	of	a	medical	context,	we	still	most	
often	 have	 to	 have	 autopsies.	 Otherwise,	 if	 there’s	 going	 to	 be	 an	 investigation,	 the	
investigation	tends	not	to	get	anywhere.	Coroner	7		
The	evidentiary	requirements	of	the	coronial	system	The	 second	 central	 finding	 of	 this	 research	 is	 that	 the	 evidence	 (the	medical	 opinion)	 provided	by	 the	pathologist	is	not	only	principally	understood	by	the	coroner	as	‘objective	truth’,	it	is	also	administratively	deployed	by	the	coroner	as	an	objective	truth.	The	detail	of	the	pathologist’s	evidence	is	widely	regarded	as	 irrelevant	by	the	coroner,	with	the	sole	relevant	 issue	being	an	unequivocal	statement	as	to	cause	of	death.			
We	come	from	completely	different	standpoints;	we	simply	want	to	know	the	cause	of	death,	
so	why	do	we	need	the	nth	degree	about	the	weight	of	each	organ	etc.	And	so	there’s	that	
tension	between	coroners	and	pathologists.	Coroner	8.		The	 requirement	 for	 a	definitive	 cause	of	death	 is	one	of	 the	principal	 factors	organising	 the	 coroner’s	relationship	to	both	the	pathologist	and	to	their	evidence.	Coroners	are	often	presented	with	a	cause	of	death	 as	 ‘undetermined’	 by	 the	 pathologists,	 and	 this	 sits	 uneasily	 with	 both	 the	 coroners’	 visceral	expectations	regarding	the	ontology	of	medical	truth	and	the	statutory	requirements	of	the	role.			
Some	of	the	pathologists	are	producing	more	undetermined	causes	of	death	on	the	autopsy	
...	but	still	describe	in	the	report	the	various	possibilities	of	what	could’ve	caused	the	death	
—	what’s	more	likely	—	and	as	a	result	I	have	to	make	a	decision,	well,	it’s	more	likely	that	
this,	in	fact,	is	the	cause	of	death,	and	that’s	what	I’ll	say	in	my	finding.	Coroner	2		
Often	the	pathologists	will	come	back	with	an	undetermined	cause	of	death	but,	with	a	bit	of	
history	in	there	which	tells	a	little	more	about	possible	causes,	I	can	then	make	a	finding	as	
to	what	the	cause	of	death	is.	Coroner	2		The	coroners	often	sought	to	steer	the	pathologists	into	committing	themselves	to	a	particular	definitive	cause	of	death,	even	where	the	evidence	was	partial,	ambiguous	or	incomplete.	
	
She	was	umming	and	ahhing	about	whether	 it	was	a	myocardial	 infarction	or	whether	 it	
was	a	PE	[pulmonary	embolism],	and	I	just	basically	just	talked	her	through,	and	got	her	to	
reach	a	decision.	Coroner	8			
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At	the	moment,	if	there’s	multiple	possible	medications,	toxicology	testing	takes	some	time,	
months	 and	months.	 You	 can’t	 have	 the	 body	waiting	around	 so	 you	 just	 have	 to	make	a	
decision.	Coroner	2		On	those	occasions	where	the	pathologist	was	unwilling	to	allow	their	medical	opinion	to	be	translated	into	medical	 fact	—	at	 least	not	without	 further	autopsy	evidence	—	 the	 coroner’s	 irritation	was	often	clear.			
Electrocution’s	a	classic	one,	because	I’ve	had	cases	where	there	were	witnesses,	the	person’s	
going	 Bzzzzzzzzzz,	 there’s	 burn	marks	 on	 the	 hands	 from	 the	 object	 where	 the	 current’s	
passing	through	...	he	collapsed,	and	was	dead	instantly.	Now	some	pathologists	will	say	we	
still	need	to	do	an	autopsy	because	they	can’t	exclude	heart	attack	—	what's	the	chances	of	
that?	 And	 then	 what	 happens	 is	 that	 they	 refuse	 to	 certify	 that	 it	 was	 an	 electrocution!	Coroner	4		In	 summary,	 within	 the	 context	 of	 the	 coronial	 court,	 there	 exists	 a	 complex	 historical	 relationship	between	 the	 coroner	 and	 the	 pathologist,	 with	 tensions	 largely	 centering	 upon	 the	 related	 issues	 of	expertise,	 status	 and	 authority.	 Importantly,	while	medical	 information	 from	 autopsies	 is	 presented	 in	terms	 of	 ‘opinion	 and	 probability’	 by	 the	 pathologists,	 this	 evidence	 is	 translated	 by	 the	 coroners	themselves	 into	 ‘scientific	 fact’.	 This	 translation	 occurs	 for	 both	 epistemological	 and	 administrative	reasons.			
Discussion	The	results	of	this	study	suggest	two	areas	of	further	discussion.			
1)	Feyerabend’s	critique	of	science		To	what	extent	is	Feyerabend	correct	about	the	nature	of	scientific	truth-claims?	At	this	point,	it	would	be	fairly	 easy	 to	 assert	 that	 he	 is	 both	 correct,	 and	 incorrect.	 That	 is,	 Feyerabend	 is	 correct	 in	 that	 the	scientific	 evidence	 tendered	 by	 the	 pathologists	 in	 the	 coronial	 court	 is	 compulsory,	 exclusory	 and	undemocratic	—	 risk-averse	 coroners	 request	 autopsies	 as	 a	 matter	 of	 reflex,	 and	 this	 information	 is	prioritised	 over	 other	 sets	 of	 truth-claims,	 which	 are	 often	 marginalised	 in	 the	 process,	 such	 as	 eye-witness	accounts,	family	histories,	and	collations	of	other	evidence	from	the	scene	of	death.		However,	 it	 equally	 possible	 to	 suggest	 that	 he	would	 be	 incorrect	—	 in	 this	 instance	—	 in	 assigning	responsibility	for	these	social/ideological	elements	of	the	scientific	method	to	the	scientists	themselves.	This	research	suggests	that	while	pathologists	remain	circumspect	about	the	information	they	provide	to	the	coronial	process,	it	is	the	coroners	who	translate	that	evidence	into	the	compulsory,	the	exclusory	and	the	 undemocratic.	 Pathologists	may	 base	 their	 opinions	 upon	 ‘a	 sub-strata	 of	 facts’.	 However,	 it	 is	 the	coroners	who	interpret	that	opinion	as	unequivocal	truth:	that	is,	‘Pathologists	are	able	to	say	what	cause	of	death	is’.			However,	 Feyerabend	would	quite	 rightly	 argue	 that	 even	 though	pathologists	may	not	make	 frequent	claims	 to	 either	 complete	 scientific	 objectivity	 or	 direct	 access	 to	 the	 noumenal	 realm	 of	 facts-in-themselves,	 they	 still	 certainly	 benefit	 from	widely	held	 assumptions	 that	 these	 two	 elements	 are	part	and	parcel	of	the	scientific	method,	and	hence	part	of	the	bedrock	of	the	knowledge	it	produces.	To	put	it	another	 way,	 while	 there	 may	 be	 no	 expectation	 that	 scientists	 should	 continually	 attenuate	 each	statement	they	make	—	lest	it	is	taken	as	claim	to	objective	truth	—	over	the	last	300	years,	‘science’	(as	a	reified	 entity)	 has	 traditionally	 been	 its	 own	 best	 self-publicist	 in	 the	modernist	 struggle	 for	 the	 high	ground	of	knowledge	production	(Tait	2010).	Significantly,	coroners	are	as	exposed	to	this	rosy	depiction	of	science	as	the	rest	of	us.			
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2)	Medicine	and	the	legal	process		A	trial	is	presumed	to	be	a	search	for	truth,	but,	technically,	 it	 is	a	search	for	a	decision.	(Felman	1997:	738)		In	 addition	 to	 both	 the	 historic,	modernity-related	 reasons	 for	 coroners	 to	 valorise	 and	 reify	 scientific	‘facts’,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 more	 contemporary	 cultural	 forces	 that	 have	 accentuated	 this	 perception,	 it	 is	arguably	 the	 legal	 system	 itself	 that	 requires	 its	 expert	 evidence	 to	 be	 conceptualised	 in	 terms	 of	objective	 truth.	 Kramar	 (2006)	 argues	 that	 pathologists	 are	 not	 simply	 reading	 biological	 information	when	 assessing	 cause	 of	 death;	 they	 are	 filtering	 that	 information	 through	 personal	 and	 professional	moral	lens	to	reach	their	conclusions.	These	subjective	judgements	are	distilled	into	medical	knowledge:		 which	 is	 taken	 up	 in	 law	 as	 expert	 opinion	 evidence	 to	 become	 legal	 fact.	 Once	 this	evidence	 has	 become	 legal	 fact,	 it	 becomes	 unassailable,	 having	 both	 passed	 medical-scientific	scrutiny	and	been	accepted	as	independent,	disinterested	medical	knowledge	…	(Kramar	2006:	818)			The	 foundational	 logic	 of	 this	 argument	 is	 supported	 by	 Latour	 (2010:	 229)	 who	 states	 that	 both	scientists	and	lawyers	(pathologists	and	coroners)	speak	‘the	truth’,	but	each	according	to	quite	different	criteria:	‘two	distinct	conceptions	of	exactitude	and	talent,	of	faithfulness	and	professionalism,	of	scruple	and	 objectivity’.	 Crucially,	 scientists	 struggle	 to	 understand	 how	 judges	 can	 employ	 the	 term	‘incontrovertible	fact’	to	evidence	that	has	not	been	subject	to	rigorous	critique	and	counter-submission.	Latour	(2010)	asserts	that	in	cases	where	scientific	evidence	is	required	—	as	in	coronial	investigations	—	it	is	law,	rather	than	science,	that	seeks	the	objective	authoritative	fact.	It	is	seen	to	be	the	task	of	the	coroner	 to	 constitute	 a	 domain	 of	 unassailable	 truth	 as	 soon	 as	 possible,	 so	 that	 this	 truth	 can	 be	deployed	 within	 the	 administrative	 and	 judicial	 framework	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law.	 Importantly,	 the	 most	important	element	of	the	rule	of	law	is	‘the	judgement’	—	in	this	case,	the	finding	as	to	cause	of	death.			
Conclusion	This	research	has	reached	a	number	of	conclusions,	some	predictable	within	the	context	of	the	coronial	inquiry,	 others	 less	 so.	 First,	 coroners	 and	pathologists	 have	 a	 complex	 and	 often	 difficult	 relationship	within	death	 investigations,	 and	while	 coroners	have	 the	 final	word	 in	determining	cause	of	death,	 the	evidence	of	the	pathologist	carries	considerable	weight,	more	weight	indeed	than	any	other	contributor	to	 the	 proceedings.	 Second,	 while	 the	 pathologists	 present	 their	 evidence	 in	 terms	 of	 opinion	 and	probability,	this	is	interpreted	by	the	coroner	as	objective	fact;	that	is,	within	the	context	of	the	coronial	inquiry,	 the	 coroner	 translates	 the	 ontology	 of	 the	 pathologist’s	 evidence	 into	 detached,	 independent	truth.	Third,	these	newly-minted	‘medical	facts’	are	not	only	understood	by	the	coroner	as	truths,	they	are	administratively	deployed	 as	 such	 to	 reach	a	 legal	decision	as	 to	 cause	of	death.	 Finally,	 and	by	way	of	summary,	 this	 research	 suggests	 that	 the	 chief	 conveyers	 of	 the	 ideology	 of	 scientific	 and	 medical	certainty	are	not	the	pathologists	themselves,	but	rather	the	coroners.	This	is	in	part	because	of	a	broad	acceptance	of	 the	 ‘infallibility’	 ideology	by	coroners,	but	also	because	of	 the	administrative	and	 judicial	requirements	of	the	coronial	system	itself.		
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